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Lisbon Treaty – Military Structures 
Many of those who oppose the Lisbon Treaty cite its European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP) and Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP) provisions as cause for 
concern in terms of how they might impact on Irish neutrality or serve to create a pan-
European army to rival NATO.  Those clauses of the Lisbon Treaty which address 
security and defence issues are worthy of debate, and may cause concern in some 
quarters.  They do not however impact directly on Irish neutrality.  Nor do they amount to 
a charter for the creation of a standing European army. 
 
Much of what the Lisbon Treaty addresses in military terms – simply reiterates ESDP and 
CSFP aspirations that have already been stated in previous EU Treaties and Summits.  In 
relation to the concept of a ‘Common European Defence’ – this issue was addressed 
eleven years ago at Article 17 of the Amsterdam Treaty 1997 wherein it stated ‘CSFP 
shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive 
framing of a common defence policy  … which might lead to a Common Defence, should 
the European Council so decide’. Further reference to Common European Defence was 
made at the EU Summit of Cologne 1999 where it was intended ‘to give the EU the 
necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common 
ESDP’.   
 
Therefore, mention within the Lisbon Treaty of the ‘progressive framing of a common 
defence policy that might lead to a common defence’ is not new.  What is new however is 
the summary of provisions contained within the Lisbon Treaty which explicitly exclude 
all such future ESDP and CSFP decisions at EU level from qualified majority voting 
(QMV).  Ratification of the Treaty would have two effects in relation to Ireland’s neutral 
stance.  A yes vote would preserve our sovereign input into EU security and defence 
decisions at the level of Council of Ministers. The Lisbon Treaty would therefore ensure 
that any decision about a future common defence – or indeed any future EU civilian 
mission or military operation - could only be taken by unanimous vote at the EU Council 
of Ministers.  By preserving the intergovernmental nature – with all EU member states 
having equal status – with regard to CSFP and ESDP decisions Ireland would remain 
capable of effectively expressing her neutral stance in a manner that would meaningfully 
impact on EU defence decisions.  In other words, a yes vote would guarantee Ireland’s 
ability to veto any future common defence concept – or indeed any EU military mission 
or operation that Ireland deemed inappropriate. 
 
With regard to the possible future militarization of Europe one element of the Treaty – 
highlighted as potentially controversial by its opponents - lies in its reference to the 
European Defence Agency (EDA). This is the first reference to the EDA in an EU Treaty.  
However, de facto the EDA has existed by a decision of the member states since 2004.  
The purpose of the EDA is to audit and enhance individual EU military capabilities in 
order to enhance the ability of member states to cooperate with each other as crises arise 
– on a case by case basis.  This would not have the effect of militarising the EU – in the 
commonly accepted sense - as a collective martial entity.  The function of the EDA is to 
make each member state’s approach to defence budgeting and the development of 
military capabilities ‘coherent’ – to avoid unnecessary duplication of defence spend or 
defence research and development effort across each state.   
 
For example, the EU as a whole spends 40% of what the US spends on defence.  But the 
EU does not have anything approaching 40% of US military capability.  Nor does the EU 
have 40% of US political influence globally.  Europe is wasting its defence spend on 
‘incoherent’ approaches to developing flexible civil and military responses to man made 
and natural disasters. For example there are currently 16 separate – and highly costly - 
research and development programmes within the EU focussed on armoured personnel 
carrier development.  The purpose of the EDA is to eliminate such replication in order to 
achieve economies of scale and increase overall EU military cohesiveness and 
effectiveness.  Thus, the EDA would encourage individual member states to specialise in 
military areas such as heavy air-lift, logistics or medical and engineering expertise. The 
EDA is not designed to function as a procurement agency for a permanently-configured 
‘standing’ European Army.  Rather, it is an agency designed to rationalise the current 
spending of taxpayers Euros in order to evolve flexible, effective, and rapidly configured 
EU civil-military responses to future international crises.  These future, temporarily 
configured, EU ‘coalitions of the willing’ – with their emphasis on civil-military options 
– might well provide a viable pro-social alternative the current global hegemony of an 
increasingly militarised United States.  
 
To this end the predominantly humanitarian and peacekeeping ‘St. Petersberg Tasks’ of 
the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty have been significantly expanded upon in the Lisbon Treaty 
to include ‘joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice 
and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces 
in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation.  All these 
tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries 
in combating terrorism in their territories’.  Whilst this represents a significant widening 
of the concept of operations that the EU might decide upon – on a strictly unanimous and 
case by case basis – it is not a novel concept and has already been provided for in the EU 
European Security Strategy of 2003.  Voting yes to the Lisbon Treaty in this regard, 
would commit the EU to considering – by a unanimous vote of its member states only – 
to a wider suite of military options than has been stated in previous treaties and summits, 
as possible interventions and responses to international crises.  This would, in theory, 
allow the EU, where necessary, to take robust and rapid action – independent of NATO 
or the US – to counter threats of genocide, terrorism or criminality within the EU’s 
sphere of influence.  Such robust responses - as evidenced by the Irish-led EUfor mission 
to Chad – can be difficult to mount rapidly.  Once deployed however, such operations 
would allow the EU to legitimately extend its sphere of influence globally - independent 
of US or the competing influences of other international actors such as China or Russia.  
 
The Lisbon Treaty allows for ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation’ (PSC) between EU 
member states who are committed to permanent collective military capabilities and 
alliances.  This provision of the Treaty would allow European nations such as France and 
Germany to formalise their military integration across their national boundaries.  This 
would in effect, create potential pre-existing ‘coalitions of the willing’ for future ESDP or 
CSFP operations or missions – decided upon by unanimous vote of the EU Council of 
Ministers.  Whilst the Lisbon Treaty would allow for member states to further facilitate 
PSC by way of qualified majority voting – no member state can be compelled to enter 
into such military arrangements.  Voting no to the Treaty would not prevent PSC.  Many 
member states such as Germany, France and Britain are already embarked upon such a 
process independent of EU structures.  Ratifying the Treaty would simply allow this 
process to proceed under the control and direction of the EU. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty, insofar as it addresses military matters, does not impact on Ireland’s 
neutrality or upon Ireland’s sovereignty.  Under the terms of the Treaty, Ireland would 
retain the power of veto over any future CSFP or EDSP decision by the EU.  Under the 
terms of the Treaty, Ireland could also continue to operate the ‘Triple Lock’ mechanism 
with regard to considering our participation in any future CSFP or EDSP operation or 
mission to which we had agreed in principle.  Unlike those at NATO, the EU’s military 
structures – as envisaged in the Lisbon Treaty and previous treaties, summits and 
strategies – are modest in size but ambitious in scope.  A yes vote for the Treaty would 
not create a permanent standing EU army – but would enhance the EU’s ability to mount 
flexible, tailor made and credible responses to emerging humanitarian and security crises 
in the future.  The Lisbon Treaty is drafted in such a manner that Ireland can make a 
valuable military and political contribution to this process by way of the EU military 
committee and the EU Political and Security Committee without diluting her sovereignty 
or neutral status. 
 
Dr. Tom Clonan is the Irish Times Security Analyst.  He lectures in the School of Media, 
DIT.  tclonan@irish-times.ie 
 
    
  
 
   
 
 
